Some Tor users already disable scripts for security reasons. Our onion service also disables the scripts that normally run in readers’ browsers. And the site does not include any third-party advertising or sharing of information with third parties. Users of the Guardian’s onion service will not be able to create Guardian accounts or sign in to their existing account (if they have one). We hope to minimise the digital breadcrumbs that get left by reader activity and that could help malign actors from identifying them. Our onion service also promotes anonymity in other ways. An example of such a risk could be that the “exit node” – the gateway between the normal web and the Tor network – could contain malicious software or be located somewhere that is subject to censorship. The introduction of a Guardian onion service means that the entire communication pathway between a reader and the Guardian takes place within the Tor network, thereby avoiding potential risks with the “hop” between the Tor network and the world wide web service. But the browsers’ communications have to exit the Tor network for the final leg of the journey in order to get to the site on the normal world wide web. These browsers route their communications over the Tor network – thereby concealing the reader’s location.

Guardian readers have always been able to access using tools such as Tor Browser. This means users can bypass censorship in parts of the world where access to independent news might be difficult or if certain websites and services are banned.

Tor also makes it harder for internet service providers to identify what their users are accessing. The Tor network helps conceal its users’ locations, which makes tracking their internet activity much more difficult.

Its .onion address on the tor network